Um, okay. Just let us know, okay.
I guess I you know just in terms of how we organize this project and why I think what I think has gone well and what has not gone as well. I think that the fact that it's collaborative that it's cross disciplinary that it's we sort of like looked around and said, you know, you know, who do we need to cover all of these issues rather than sometimes these kinds of things I think come out of more narrow sense of I'm only interested in this and you end up with a project or a book that's that doesn't and so we very much we're trying to be comprehensive. We said, you know, this is a real benefit to putting everything on place and
And it was more with an introduced in having sort of a public discussion that had all those things in one place so that journalists or students or whoever could sort of say, you know, the here's a range of issues and I actually I think what we should do even so when we're not completely comprehensive and we could have our blank spots even listed on our website, you know, here's what we don't know yet. Here's what we should know. I think that would be
most more accurate and and motivational and to keep working on filling in those gaps, but I think
you know, we and so many people were so motivated to do it that we were so we were very lucky in that way that you know, when we asked I don't think anybody said no, you know, we just
shoot people an email and they said I'd love to you know.
Write up what I know or do a little more work and and try and come up with something on on this issue.
So but then again, we have no funding we have I mean Watson Institute supports us. We we really I think you know some of the main
Security funders peace funders. I don't think they're that interested. There's the sensitivity about you know, what?
You know, it's it's not a happy story and you know, they remain very focused on on the nuclear issue.
So I I would have
Been a lot happier, and we've gotten a lot farther if we'd had.
you know one of the one of the big funders or you know
Some kind of support to be able to do much more than we have.
But anyway, we kept thinking about you know, the end you said your audience is Congress and our audience was.
You know the general US public so I think we kept thinking you know, what what are what are the questions that are not getting asked or what are the questions that keep getting really superficial answers. So we had a lot of brainstorm in the beginning about you know,
what do people already believe about more in general or about this war or these wars and then you know, let's
Obviously if we if our experts were saying, you know, that's just not right. We need to address the
that sort of existing template right? You're not speaking into the void. You're speaking into some pretty fixed ideas.
About what should be happening what has happened?
So I think we we don't always remind ourselves of that. But I think it was a good way to to think so when obviously you probably got a pretty clear set of ideas about what Congress should know what Congress has been doing wrong this last.
Set of years when it comes to the funding process and and thinking about it. So do you have a list of that already? I do. Yeah, actually, okay. Yeah, that's great. I think that's that's super important. Yeah.
Yeah, I mean one of them being of course, I'm I don't know if you would agree, but from to my eye that that idea that the political process just ended up.
suggesting that nothing could be done that was not in service to
you know the military goals and that that was so distorting and
so, you know, I think that's that's how we got to start the project how we
how we
you know conceptualized it, you know again the journalists we felt were were often just working with a really thin rule of information and you know that your reports have been a godsend to everybody but and including I you know, one of them to me one of the most impressive parts has been this sort of that continued attention to what it is that you don't know so that map of the the blank spots that sort of blinded, you know, sort of Imagine The One-Eyed or the quarter. I'd look at the situation that comes from having to to work on, you know, having lots of inputs pouring into places that are not visible to you. That's right. Yeah.
I mean and that's very interesting. I mean Matt also, he worked on an auditoon Augustine before joining us and yeah. Oh so you were raising convert?
Okay, yeah.
So I'm sure he has some observations about that actually.
Yeah, I know in one of my colleagues a big whiteboard blank and all well it was blank except for this one phrase. It was no what you don't know and that was really guiding principle, you know.
Fantastic, who's who coined that I don't know there were there were quotes around it. So it was you know, that that's right. Exactly. Yeah, that's like that. I don't know why this reminds me of it. It's one of those I guess there's probably linguistic term for it, but the Special Forces
the sort of slogan which is
very depresso. No. No, it's oh gosh.
Follow the rules and rule number one follow the rules.
And rule number two. There are no rules or something like this. It was anyway.
So and so, what did you all then?
I mean what if you then do yeah you yes for the audits. Yeah. So every year they kind of get together with other inspector generals and they kind of divvy up sort of the topics and say everyone goes full out and says, this is what we're just in the next year. We're gonna look at these topics. So that's the initial starting point and then
Once the toxorosen teams are formed.
Everything else is laid out the report that I was working on and that it's still not out quite yet. It should be coming out next couple weeks because these things are usually 12 months 13 months process. I've been working on local security. Mainly the Afghan local police. Okay, we're doing sort of a performance valuation.
On that whole soft lead program and what that meant for local Villages and what it meant for the overall security environment and Afghanistan. It's very interesting switching from the audits side to now this new Lessons Learned program where there's a
That we have I feel like we're much different entity than the rest of cigar. We have more of a
an intellectual freedom. I suppose creativity license to I take that line back but a little more Liberty to explore these ideas that aren't the traditional.
Inspector General type of work
it's liberating.
To be thinking about these issues the ones that we you know, all the reports that have come out basically from the cigar audit side. It's
Highlighting wasted money or potential fraud we're now this is sort of a proactive take on the the next iteration of contingency operations.
what we can learn going forward since the why you know, I mean audits are the what and this is the lessons learned from them is the why why would you well so good I mean so
You know Alp Afghan local police is a good example of sort of.
Why did we need that right in the first place? Why did that become the necessary and and model for dealing with security problems at the local level? And I think you know
My experience was my perception after spending a lot of time in the field is that we needed because we didn't plan for it. We needed it because we didn't understand the environment that we were working in at all and we were very limited in the sense of our we had this principal agent problem in terms of art dependency on proxies particularly in the Northern Alliance who directed us down to certain path those were choices and there's a path dependency that we don't often acknowledge.
In in our strategic approaches, right?
And even even internally in our conversations in cigar, what's interesting is that convincing? Our leadership of the fact that there is a path dependency has been you know, actually very difficult to do. You know, Mr. Taco is a very smart man, but you know, he is a former Congressman, you know Congress Aid and legislative investigator. So he comes with particular mindset and and so great actually to have that as our test case in some ways because we know that when we shop this to Congress and say look, you know
if it's beginning
making decision that you're going to invest in regime change you had made a clear and conscious decision to then have a plan. So what comes afterwards particularly in the realm of security systems you would not have had to guess.
At the requirements or you may have guessed at it.
You know in terms of equipping and training and so forth.
I've actually probably invested right up front in building your own.
Bureaucratic architecture to serve as that need but that didn't actually happen for the first five years.
your own bureaucratic architecture meaning that would actually from For Soup To Nuts do the planning to delivery is supposed to
because there is that whole question about the degree to which things should be devolved and and it should be cash transfers rather than program management all the way down by the
useful in the context of Sierra Leone Liberia where you have a standing military this military was military and so incredibly fragmented.
The DDR exercise was so challenging because of the fragmentation.
We were talking about at one point. I think the UNS estimated it was like 250,000 combatants that they thought they had put on the rules for DDR that's quite a lot in a country of 32 million and it may be you know, that underestimation and then you had the you know the cash as a weapons and so forth but never stop coming and in fact, you know the Soviet exit.
you know the genevo chords have a number of
stipulations around having a military Observer team
to ensure that no weapons continued coming in from Pakistan and so forth and from Russia as well.
And you know, the contingent was 12 people, right? So let's not do that again. Yeah, you know should be should be exit.
You know in a similar way.
and come up with some series of chords, which I imagine it is what people Envision the reconciliation process be so that you're saying there were 12 people working on the implementation of
Of monitoring weapons transfers, okay.
Yeah at the end of at the end of the Soviet intervention in 92 91.
so
and that of course, you know, it's all very quickly once the Civil War then.
Broke out it could not right there 12 people but I do that. Yeah, right.
You know and I I have a feeling that today's decision from Obama. I mean, what do you mean?
the question
that's the only alternative at the stage, which is a terrible thing to say. I might not have said that a while ago.
Because you didn't you might not have thought things were as bad as they are.
the field understand and and you know, the happy talk that we get off of Washington is
Really just that right?
You can seem to painfully inevitable.
Guitar coming from the palace that requests over the last, you know whole year for this new Administration the nug all the Ministries. I think it was
bound to happen. Yeah.
I mean there were two because they were all asking yes, but why is it inevitable that?
Obama would conceived the request. Well, I think they're two two reasons.
One is that certainly an observation? We mean that they find in ashrafghani a willing partner. Yeah, they did not find that in car's eye and it would have been very difficult to make the case of Congress. You know that there was a cars I like figure
Stone office
student that this is somebody that we can work with and he will not you know.
Transfer weapons to Rogue Insurgency, whatever right?
So that's a big factor. I think in the thinking I think it's very influential and you know in Ashraf has a Visa Columbia University graduated here. Just a very American demeanor, you know, he seems like he can play ball right? So that's very good the second pieces, honestly.
you know Isis is just
the shadow of every decision now, you know.
Waiting for the same.
But here's the question I guess is what would be different a year from now and that's where I guess, you know, the the evaluation of the security.
Part of this the that that for ponderance of that 110 billion is Security money correctly. So
y has that.
you know, I know the the sort of popular narrative is
the United States is the only thing standing between
you know.
Afghanistan and the Taliban
Iraq and the or Syria and Isis
but that's sort of that continuing promise of security indigenous security just seems
Wait, what do you make of that? I mean that yeah the idea that all that funding.
Because that's the big piece of the dollars anyway, right and the idea that all this time later.
They're not able to sustain the defense.
So that's a big part of my study. Actually. Honestly, I have a few answers to the question. I guess in the first would be around.
There are very problematic budgeting system and
how much?
the quirks of our budgeting system
impacted certainly DOD in States ability to really estimate the cost.
accurately
and to transfer funds in a timely manner.
so
You know.
in terms of
the proportionality between the civilian assistance versus security assistance. I quite agree. It's extremely problematic and you know, we've done some studies on that as well. Just looking at you know, how the pie change how it was divided over time and then sort of looking at that against it's a great of violence, you know, you know, and what do you what do we find? I mean we find actually the more the more spending that the military did in certain areas.
Around there was now is that a cause and effect? No, we don't know but we assume some sort of correlation.
I think there's room to be done, you know for a deeper study and was this.
Absolute amount or relative to the civilian spending.
Disease must look at both. So we looked particularly sir, which is the Commander's emergency response from program. And we looked at that because we also looked at Asic which is the Afghan security force is fun. That's quite different reason we looked at sir was because it is one of the only funds other than another fun called Sika which is a usaid civilian driven fund so far more.
What kind of thing?
But surface the only other thing where you can tie the spend to the actual geographical location for whatever reason is, you know, I guess probably since it's walking around but if a commanders rules around it changed over time, you know, there were more restrictions imposed on it, which was a good thing ultimately but not enough maybe and now it's Global. Okay, right. So it's a global tool once what was you know, basically a tool for a group of commanders in Iraq.
To solve their local problems like sewage and trash collection that kind of thing.
became very quickly a globalized fun that can be used in any context from the construction extremely problematic in the sense that you know, you're taking
you know.
Originally captains a Majors, you know, maybe 20 somethings.
And telling them here's a million dollars spend away during your tour and three year. Yeah and
And you often and that's found that people couldn't spend it fast enough. They could not man and therefore the projects oftentimes crazier and crazier and bigger and bigger, you know more flat screens involved, right? Yeah. And so, you know, that's extremely problematic. Yeah, but what do you do with argue?
They're not wrong about this is that because of this inflexibility and the authorities?
core civilian funding but State homes
And stayed on some smaller Point portion of the pie. There was no other way to get money there fast enough.
Right. So the question is, you know.
Speed of delivery, right?
But this and is this study published yet, or or is it it is not we are I am writing it. I'm just writing it right now actually here playing around but it's good for you to refresh. Actually. I find when I spend time talking about it at helps me. I'm sure yes.
No, but I'll be very interested to see yeah, a lot of the data research has been done. A lot of the analysis has been done on the budget and
something you know.
in addition to the sort of
hard Bond reports that will go out very similar to the the quarter lease that we do. We're hoping to have a website eventually or some find some sort of home for this stuff where other all the Lessons Learned for all the lessons learned and for all the data Associated places, right? And do you I mean, obviously this is a
That's a process that people use in lots of different Arenas right? But I'm just wondering you know that when I have worked a little bit with the UN and they have Lessons Learned section and and I was struck when I first encountered I got very excited. So wow, it's gonna be all this great, you know date. I'm Gonna Learn I'm gonna prepare myself to do what I was gonna do and it was just
I don't know what it was it was.
I think the most important stuff wasn't there that we if it was important they had somebody kept it in their pocket or I don't know what it was, but it just looked.
I mean maybe it was partly investment that people were just not that invested in in doing that. They just kept putting one foot from the other but but when I you know, you're you could just
go back to the your plan for this. I'm sure you're already you're in your your this is all pretty, you know, all in process already pretty set. But the thing that strikes me as missing.
You know, you've got your sectors. You've got your you know, this sort of the bureaucratic.
process language
but the the question of
Maybe One Step Up from all of this which would be
more again the why at the highest level, right?
and some of those bigger questions of
well frankly race of you know
you know the inequality of nation states and and
you know the very categories of fragility versus strength, which have correlates that are
You know are not going to that are super relevant, right?
You know, how did Afghanistan end up in that state? Why will it likely still be in that state 30 years from now?
frankly, right, I mean
a few states have surprised us and 20th Century history and leapfrogged over others somehow but the
there's tended to be a pretty stable sort of, you know, even if things improve overall for everyone. There's still that that inequality right and and that that sets up certain conditions.
of ignorance and knowledge that completely affect what it is that you'll be able to do with the anybody will be able to do with
with this and I mean that that was the point of the very controversial and I have to say happy to see sort of dying cultural terrain teams, right which is the idea that you somehow would have a better understanding of
this is a larger cultural context but what that that project didn't do and couldn't do was step back to those higher order questions of
You know why? They're not here what happens when?
The United doing some work there that you know that how pervasive and strong and the assumption is of you know, these people are just not as good or bright or capable as we are and they may be our allies. We may call them brother. But you know, in fact when it gets down to it, I really don't assume that they can really carry this ball. I got to carry it and it's not just because it's transition to something right. So I think that
I don't know what you would call that but there's maybe a third track of of the sort of first first principles kind of thing and
And that's where it's I think some of that.
Those are bigger questions that we hoped to we haven't really.
address them directly
but the bigger questions that we hope to ask in the cost of War project, which is you know, basically, what's the impact of the belief of a set of beliefs about the efficacy of force. How does that continue to lead everybody?
Away from a maybe more sensible efficacious path, right the idea that in the end.
You're always going to be.
on the job of repair
of of can what kinetic forces done
as opposed to first of all saying
nobody
how much and where did that kinetic Force get applied?
and if that sounds way too no abstract, but it's not abstract, although
So I can answer.
Why wouldn't we include that? Well, I would love to and I certainly plan to talk about the construct of federal states in my analysis instead of where that emerged from.
But we don't have that mandate which is interesting. It had we been a presidential commission for instance. You know, I think we probably might have had the Mandate then question the assumptions in a much deeper way. Okay, right, but because you know though we are an independent agency.
You know, or maybe we have an interpreter ourselves to have that mandate. Let's just put that way. I think that there's because we do have this audit function. There's like I'd say there's one side of the house.
That really feels very uncomfortable with discussing.
policy questions and policy implications and
because it doesn't fall under government accountability standards, right? You can't apply a set of criteria to it and how because that's somebody else's job. Your job is to take that. Apparently. This is what happens when you invite insurgents into machine, right? I mean, it's of course are you okay for sure because we're certainly pushing that line. We're pushing close to that line and we cannot go there. I mean we just have these
very obvious restrictions on I think critiquing some of the policy although inherent in
How we approach the question is a critique anyway, right, you know, so I have a few.
I've been sort of summarizing lately.
Some of the takeaways from the project so far. So, you know, there were some inherent contradictions between our objectives under the rubric of counterinsurgency and work of counterterrorism and development. These sort of three wheels were spinning at different speeds and you know in Reverse course from each other, right? That's a nice metaphor the three wheels of
Counterterrorism kind of Insurgency and development. Yeah.
and
what we can I will quote you if I ever.
Now, I'm sure some of this would be off the record for you too. Right? Certainly. I'm pretty comfortable. I've read on this and I won't find a publicly. So, you know, let's see if I get fired as a result, but
I think the idea that you have to start with, you know, the the policy is.
Intervention, yeah during or post conflict and intervention in the sense of nation building.
But I presume that some of the things that you can do is to hear are the premises. Yeah, we're going to take that forgiven but notice that they're there right.
And if that's your you know, if you're using that hammer.
That policy your possible outcomes are one two three, depending on how you do that.
And notice that there are you know, maybe it's a footnote that was another couple Alternatives where four five six could happen or one two and six could happen.
So I mean, but I guess that's you know, we all step into I do all the time. I'm teaching I step in at some point. My students aren't necessarily there and you know.
They could use those first couple premises that I was I was operating with that's right. That's learning process song. And so that's exactly you know,
and boys that hard to capture, you know in terms of
Although some of the scholar literature. Does that some of the academics who step back and they say, you know
You know, here's the something some of the histories here some of the alternate ways that you know development has happened when it's Grassroots versus top down. For example, Laura the many more complex versions of
of those possibilities
So I think you know the literature is there to to cite and we will yeah, we will up to the point. Yeah, you know again, it's so funny. How nervous
Forget you know people who've worked in government for a long time. They get very nervous about
you know.
literature review
what I just it confuses them a little bit so because just because an audit organization is at almost as cut and dryness they come yeah in that way. That's right. And that is what struck me about the reports that that this amazing amazing work of.
you know looking straight at the problem not looking away getting as much of the reality that but like you say, it's
The difference between you know fraud waste abuse.
And then just to plan out mistaken effort correctly and properly non fraudulently not abusively none corruptly done. Yeah that all just that's not in your in your
Under your Searchlight. No, although I think some of our correctives are and and that's sort of an interesting. Oh tell me what you mean. Well, I mean certainly in the realm of
Investigations and I wonder if we probably will end up doing something a little bit more fulsome than we are doing on corruption actually.
I think we may do in the area of procurement in particular right where?
Some of the lessons that have been learned there just by us as an agency are around.
our lack of knowledge
of the networks
the
familial triangle political ethnic networks that connect people
Right and create an economy in an open selves. And I mean, I know that one of our colleagues is working on the kind of corruption report for us who's an expert on corruption. We worked at the embassy for a long time.
Is thinking about making some recommendations about studying the social networks right before you get involved as a means of vetting?
Your Contracting practices, right?
actually just by came here after we had a noon talk by somebody here who has been researching this Atari refugee camp Oh and she is an anthropologist who has spent, you know, really long time on the ground there and the specifically discovered she overlaid a map of the sort of kinship networks of this one group The all hotaries
And this Atari camp and found that they were plus they weren't all together, but they were clustered right by the main Services the UN office the hospital the NGO and that there's this one and that they had established a sort of Mafia like hold on the jobs that were being created.
for and
And that you know people came into the camp they had if they claimed membership in this extended family. They had to come and register formally with him.
And that is fascinating. Yeah.
That is real. But that's we didn't study. Sorry. She's she's right here. So you could talk with you if you have time while you're here.
saratogen
t o b i n that's fascinating.
yeah, yeah well, and so what's interesting actually I mean but in in apparently in some
Happy collaboration with the UN.
That one of the head un folks who was basically saying, you know, this is this is a form of governance and we're gonna accept it, right.
Wow.
so
if I had sort of I mean if I had a magic wand a lot of money and I was actually charged or something, you know, I mean, this would be one of my recommendations actually is to do those types of studies. So I'm very, you know,
Heart in here that because as you probably know or maybe you sense.
a lot of the people who now were on the government of Afghanistan
Are those very Mafia figures from the camps? Yeah, right from the campground Pakistan. Okay. There are some Who Remain inside right as well the survivors Who Remain inside but there's sort of like, I guess, you know different.
Difference of clusters I guess a families obviously some of them, you know, very deeply associated with the royal family, you know.
I mean people often bypass that in their analysis of AF.
ghanistan, they sort of
Right over their head certainly certainly in our planning that is the case.
We did not mean you just look for a human beings who have proper looking. Yeah, the credential of and English or whatever. Yeah English is Destiny in these situations, you know.
And I think that would be the case for a long time to come. Yeah.
Well, that's an example probably that sounds like that that's sort of rule number two or something. Right? If your selection criteria are are that simplistic obviously essential but yet.
Deeply sociological right?
You know who owns who owns the English language skills is not random.
Okay now not at all. Yeah, I mean it's well.
Yeah 12.
Yeah, so it's all it's sort of replicating.
The same inequalities. Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. I totally agree, you know, I mean and that's sort of again wealth in a certain kind of Mobility that in the context of Serial war in Afghanistan was not always just some original class position, but was
Was based in sort of opportunities of of that dislocation or no?
I think that's right.
Although I mean so or is it pretty?
Pretty overwhelmingly.
It's waves you might of course, it's it's
the first to get out of the mouth
Yeah, at least in Afghanistan, right? And because they're the first to really have the war or the tensions impact them and I you know, I think in the case of the royal family in particular, you know.
Tomb I'm sort of tertiary related through various friends.
It's very striking in Kabul, you know who for instance who owns land, right?
And those who returned I mean.
Many the house I lived in for instance.
When the first house I lived in was on the footprint of one of the sons of the former King.
And so, you know and and his great.
Nephews had returned, you know to reclaim that man.
huge huge piece of a couple, you know enormous and
so that that whole there's definitely sort of
a deep
a deep-seated sort of
for the landed classes
right in these places
You know particularly in Central Asia.
so
it I mean to me that sounds like a really
key piece of an argument that you sound like you're making which is makes huge amount of sense to me which is to say
What do we do?
to make things worse meaning what do we do to particularly through this sort of massive influx of resources to
create a more unjust Society meaning more inequality or very, you know, maybe new forms of inequality. But like you're suggesting in Afghanistan, at least it's it's on the very much on the foundation of the old.
Forms and just just have that at that insight and first in people's minds when they start.
making the big plans would seem like a good idea because the long-term sustainability of any
peace-building processes that you know a sense that
You know that this is sustainable for everybody, you know from for most people. Yeah to have the arrangements that that are
Emerging. Yeah, I mean it's inequality. That's unsustainable. Yeah, right. Just what leads to war in the first place, right? So
Yes, obviously, we're wondering into the territory of a book rather than a policy prescription, but I do think I mean certainly, you know.
to give you an idea one of the other pieces that we looked at or these I am very interesting looking at is you know, the question of sustainment costs, right, you know, which is huge issue for DOD enormous right when they're gaming these things out, you know, they often
They play a sort of hide the hide the ball right with Congress on that one piece because it's very sensitive. It's you know.
As far as how why is it so sensitive compared to Congress is concerned if the military asks for sustainment.
It must get.
I mean putting people's lives at risk.
The question is do you need to idle every single tank car truck? 24/7
And because of your concerns about security because the cost of that right? I mean it actually do that.
Yes.
The trucks are running. They're everywhere. Yes. I mean it's it is standard operating procedure on the basis well to idle their trucks.
for the quick getaway
Is that amazing? Yeah. Yeah. There's a momentum to these policies that right government can't pull back from in some cases. You just get caught up and you can't break some of these Cycles because they're institutionalized now.
Well choices haven't had to be made.
Yeah, but
the goal is and so I suppose you know where we cannot do we cannot raise these.
Big principle first principal questions that's military operations. That's not even in your purview. Really right? Well, that's what people
Here's why?
I mean when it comes down.
standing costs
particularly around fuel. Okay, because that's just a huge chunk of the change. This is the fuel cost.
actually, it's
not just the burning of it. They're using of it. It is the transition here, right?
And we learn from our experience in Afghanistan. And this is where I think you know softco I think became very alerted very quickly to the connection between you know,
Sustainment costs warfighting costs and then reconstruction impacts right is around the host nation Trucking.
Contract that we had which was seven. I think it was seven different contractors who are providing transportation and also security.
And along the way you pay payoff or ones or they themselves were more likely, you know in this game. It's double game.
Where it actually paid sometimes periodically to destroy and Target convoys, right? Because then escalates the cost for providing security and so it's crazy and you get to bring another load in bring another loading disappears in trucks. Yeah.
also the film
so Black Market, okay.
So he became aware of the problem of trying to connect.
What in fact is is seems to be strictly speaking of military operational question with with the Reconstruction. Yeah, aims and goals. I would say so although you know, I think we have to know direct, you know, our agency toward a deeper study, right? And so when we're talking about content corruption right now or I think our analysis is a little bit.
You know, I begin without denigrating our colleagues, but I think that there's there's a little bit more work that can be done to develop the evidence base.
Beyond what's happening with for what's happening with the disruptions in the distortions of the economy created by our sustainable costs?
Just that that's the target line, right? And in order to measure that you've got to just pick a couple of data points really to really demonstrate like no really this is how much you distort the market when you enter with a hundred thousand boots on the ground.
And I think fuels perfect, you know couldn't be more perfect data point to grab that because you can measure it and we did start looking at that and doing some of that work.
So in the housing costs and the well, there's no that's an issue. That's interesting. Actually. So cement for instance is something that we could track very well.
So it's another example of the Big Data. Yeah.
I think so. I mean, I think that there's something to be done there and I certainly think
Once having done it for one intervention retrospectively over 14 years. You can prove you know, the point of okay. Well then transfer this stupid. Okay, you know data collections here next Enterprise, even though the pathways for fuel or for cement will be different. They will find the template for what you have to look for for and ask about it's going to be that it's gonna be available. I think so and more importantly. I mean, let's take call here at face value. Okay, and the bottom billion, where are these where are these interventions going to happen? Menlo countries, mostly mountainous? Okay. So same conditions will apply you'll have dependencies for religious lines of communication all the way.
Didn't the military used to bring things in but guessing by blivid?
Sometimes when they're that was not the is it just the scale of things that it's a scale? Yeah, it's the length of the minds of communication. And so that's you know, that's a huge issue obviously.
it's very funny actually and you think about Pakistan right in the context of this because
it does not pay for them to end this war at all because of the it's the rent. Yes, because
many people comment on to the Talib
Adapt, you know against Indians and so forth.
It's only one.
very small factor ultimately
You know.
Many many Pakistani journals have enrich themselves off this more.
Yeah, and there's no surprise. You know that a bunch of West Point graduates. Pardon Behavior going to say this now. This is off the Record.
